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Abstract
This paper assesses Illinois county government policies pertaining to the size, use, and
replenishment of unreserved funds. As political forces push for reductions in taxes and in
government itself, incentives for local governments to use less transparent means for managing
finances increase. A better understanding of the impact which fund balance policies have on the
amount of financial slack local governments keep on the one hand, and how counties use the
funds on the other, is of increasing importance. This work expands on previous analyses of
budgetary uncertainty and the possibility of using slack to stabilize service provision through
times of revenue abundance and scarcity (Marlowe, 2004, 2005; Stewart, 2009, 2011a; Stewart,
Hamman, and Pink-Harper, 2018; Tyer, 1993; Wang and Hou, 2012; Wolkoff, 1987).
1. Introduction
In the face of sustained anti-government sentiment, governments often must get by with
fewer financial resources. Many taxpayers complain that too much personal income is paid to
the government, only to be wasted; however, taxpayers also push back against service cutbacks
that result from tax reductions. As a result, state and local governments can experience serious
cash flow shortfalls since they are required, by either statute or constitutional provision, to
balance budgets. Standards set forth by organizations such as the National Association of State
Budget Officers (NASBO), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and the
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommend state and local governments
maintain at least 5% of annual general fund expenditures as savings. The GFOA recommends
even more slack for local government, up to 15% or two months of operating expenditures.
Whereas typically states set back such funds in formally designated “rainy day” accounts, local
governments rely on informal approaches such as holding fund balances in unreserved
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designations. Widely varying fund levels maintained by local governments suggest that there are
general guidelines at best and local governments may have additional purposes in mind for these
funds. Consequently, a proper accounting of fund balances in a local government’s financial
statement helps to assess the extent of its financial viability more accurately. For instance,
unreserved fund balance analysis can show whether resources are available for funding programs
and paying debt. High fund balances at the local level may show economic security and the
ability to economize. Indeed, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) views
moderately sized positive balances in unassigned general funds as a hedge against uncertainty,
funds that may be drawn down to spend counter-cyclically to stabilize government services
through economic business cycles, and a means to ensure stable tax rates. However, large
amounts of funds set aside in this way may also point to opportunities for reevaluating revenues
and tax policies. Such surplus funds may trigger political pressure for tax cuts and/or increased
spending.
The National Association of Counties (2016) reports that most states (32) require local
governments to follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) from the Federal
Accounting Standards Advisory Board. Counties in other states also choose to comply such that
a total of over 70% of U.S. counties follow GASB standards. Approximately 19% of counties
use other reporting formats decided by the state. Another 10% of counties use GAAP approved
statements but do not follow accrual accounting. This is the case mainly for counties under
50,000 in population. Like local governments elsewhere, Illinois counties typically exceed these
recommended levels of unreserved funds. For instance, if you include all Illinois counties from
for the decade of 2000 to 2010, unreserved funds as a percentage of total assets in real dollars
range from about -600 to 100%. As a percent of total net assets in real dollars, these funds range
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from -1000 to 153% of annual expenditures. However, in both cases, just a handful of counties
for a few years are at these extremes (Pulaski and Union counties in the case of unreserved as a
percentage of total assets - Champaign, Jefferson, Pulaski, and Williamson in some years if the
base is total net assets). Still, more than half of Illinois counties from 2000 to 2010 had large
savings of more than 50% of total assets. Like other states, most Illinois counties far exceed the
spirit of the GFOA recommendations of two months or the 5 to 15% level of savings.
Public accountability concerning unreserved funds depends on transparency and reporting
finances in ways that enable local officials and taxpayers alike to understand more clearly how
government assets and liabilities are intended for different purposes. Clearly understandable
financial reports can facilitate the public debate needed by elected government officials and
citizens to work toward balancing local government policy obligations with constituent interests.
This paper focuses on one important way, using policies to manage unreserved general fund
balances, for maintaining transparency and accountability. Like many people, governments save
and set aside monies for unforeseen circumstances. In fact, professional organizations like the
GFOA recommend that local governments set money aside to be used for contingencies, budget
stabilization, maintaining service levels, etc. For these practices, GFOA recommends that
governments develop and adopt formal policies to manage unassigned or carry over revenues to
assist in properly utilizing these tax revenues.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Unreserved General Fund Levels in Local Government
Compared to what is known about the states, budget scholars know considerably less about
local government savings through budget cycles. There are ample studies of state government
savings and rainy day funds (Joyce, 2001; Navin & Navin, 1997; Vasche and Williams, 1987)
and assessments of the impact of uncommitted funds on state budgets (Douglas and Gaddie,
2002; Hou and Moynihan, 2008; Knight and Levinson, 1999; Pollock and Suyderhoud, 1986).
In contrast, just a few studies investigated these issues at the local level even though counties
also budget unreserved funds (Stewart, 2009; Stewart, 2011; Stewart, 2011a; Stewart and
Hamman, 2015; Wang and Hou, 2012) and cities do also (Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2004, 2005;
Tyer, 1993; Wolkoff, 1987).
Studies find that local government unreserved general fund balances vary considerably
across jurisdictions. Many exceed the GFOA’s recommended benchmark of 5-15% or two
months of operating expenses. With such variation, many argue it is not surprising that that
GFOA’s one-size-fits-all benchmark does not apply to all jurisdictions in all circumstances.
Rather, appropriate fund levels likely depend on numerous unique factors and contexts (Wolkoff,
1987, 53). Still, there is a point for each jurisdiction at which fund balances exceed the
community’s contingency needs and at which point tax burdens increase unnecessarily (Massey
and Tyer, 1990).
A growing body of research investigates factors affecting local government unreserved
general fund balance levels and for what purpose the money is set aside. Generally, they find that
economic, financial, demographic, and institutional factors explain some of the variation among
cities and counties, but much of the variation is unexplained (Gianakis and Snow, 2007;
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Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005; Massey and Tyer, 1990; Stewart, 2009, 2011a; Wang and Hou,
2012). Given the large amounts maintained by some governments, researchers also questioned
whether the monies were used for stabilization purposes (Marlowe, 2005; Wang and Hou, 2012).
Marlowe, for example, found that although cities in Minnesota maintained a fund balance
average of about 45%, these funds made only a marginal impact on expenditures and he
questioned if there were other purposes for which these savings were maintained. Studying local
governments in North and South Carolina Shelton and Tyner found the range of fund balances
was “considerably higher than most of the targets suggested by conventional wisdom and policy
statements examined”. They suggested it was “tempting to conclude that this means that cities
are systematically maintaining excessive levels of fund balances”, but they conducted follow-up
interviews and identified legitimate reasons for building large amounts of savings. Local
governments were building savings, for example, to replace capital equipment, for selfinsurance, and the construction of a major facility (Shelton and Tyner, 1999, 5).
Perhaps just as or even more concerning than the high fund balance levels that exceed GASB
targets is the lack of transparency characterizing the processes for managing these slack
resources. Unreserved fund balances typically are not published in the budget and are
documented only in audit reports or other financial statements. These statements may be hard to
understand or even locate. Local elected officials unfamiliar with government finance may not
be aware of these reserves (Stewart, Hildreth, and Antwi-Boasiako, 2015; Tyer, 1993). Tyer
(1993) suggested that local governments need to develop a comprehensive plan on how these
funds should be managed and suggested that funds would be vulnerable to political influences
without a plan. He further added that having a plan would possibly result in citizens’ acceptance
of savings and assisting with countering forces that could work against maintaining the funds as
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well as curbing the appetites of spending agents. The Government Finance Officers Association
also recognized how vital planning was concerning these funds and developed a model to assist
local governments with the creation of fund balance policies (GFOA, 2016).
It has been hypothesized that both the motivations of elected officials and governmental
structure may influence savings. Blackley and Deboer highlight this issue of why states increased
discretionary revenues during fiscal years 1991 and 1992. They argued that despite the
unpopularity of most discretionary revenue growth, there were “several motivations for elected
official to increase revenues…. elected officials may feel that the marginal electoral benefits of
expanded services outweigh the marginal electoral costs of higher discretionary revenues”
(Blackley and Deboer, 1993, 2). Stewart (2011) found that a political form of government (Beat
systems) in Mississippi maintained more savings than an administrative form (Unit Systems).
Consistent with Marlowe (2004), Stewart argued that finding was “contrary to the view that
politicians are more concerned with short-term parochial needs to help with reelections”
(Stewart, 2011, 20). Evidence suggests that local elected officials are behaving more
bureaucratically looking to longer-term policy goals rather than spending reserves on programs
for which they can take more immediate credit.

2.2 Illinois Counties and the Maintenance of Unreserved General Fund Balances
Illinois counties are governed and administrated as they have been for over a century.
Progressive reforms that altered and modernized local government over the 20th century have not
affected Illinois county governments until relatively recently. Historically, there have been two
types of county structure and administration in Illinois. Non-township counties, as the name
implies, do not have townships (Walzer, Baird, and Gruild, 1990). These are governed by three
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commissioners elected at-large. This elected commission then appoints a chairperson to preside
over the commission (Walzer et. al, 1990). Seventeen counties have non-township county
governments. Township counties have county boards consisting of five to twenty-nine elected
members. While regulated in previous constitutions, the 1970 constitution and statutes permit
township counties to decide, within limitations, the size of the county board and whether the
officials will be elected at-large or by districts (Kenney & Brown, 1993). These members then
make one of three choices. The members can either choose to retain both the executive and
legislative functions, elect a board president to assume executive functions, or hire a professional
administrator (Walzer et. al, 1990). Currently, only 20 Illinois counties employ professional
administrators.
Townships are an important factor in county government since they can absorb some county
government responsibilities dealing with general assistance to the poor, social welfare, and
property assessment as well as construction and maintenance of roads and bridges (Hamilton,
2008). They are typically one of the lowest level taxing bodies and generally have limited
responsibilities, only providing services that municipal governments fail to provide to
unincorporated areas. In commission form counties, the county government itself has to
maintain the services provided by townships (Walzer et. al, 1990). 1 Therefore, commission
counties are expected to spend more pro-cyclically since they are more pressured to respond to
an immediate need, particularly when unemployment increases during economic downturns.

1

Cook County is an exception as the only home-rule Illinois county with a county-executive

form of government while Will County elected to adopt an executive form without home rule.
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In Illinois, a newer form of township county government, “the county administrator form”
(Banovetz & Peters, 2006b), enables counties to adapt to modern demands. It has been adopted
by 20 Illinois township counties. In these township counties, a county administrator form of
government consolidates administrative operations into a single office that reports directly to the
county board. The position is then filled with a professional administrator that serves at the
pleasure of the board in much the same fashion as city managers serve city councils in the
council manager form. County administrators in Illinois are responsible for directing the day-today functions of administrative departments under the county board’s jurisdiction (Banovetz and
Peters, 2006). They are also responsible for approving and administering budgets for all elected
county office holders and the county court system.
The question of how much counties should carry over in cash is not new. In fact, in Illinois,
this issue has been addressed many times through the years as the state legislature and watchdog
groups recognized the need to set some guidelines (Federation, 2009). Like 15 other states,
Illinois does not formally require county governments to follow GAAP. However, in practice,
annual state comptroller audit reports comply with GAAP.
(https://illinoiscomptroller.gov/services/local-government-division/). From 2000 to 2010 on
average, township counties maintained the largest proportion, .64, administrative professional
and non-township county types maintain .57 and .56 of annual total expenditures, respectively.

2.2.1 Illinois Constitution
Article 7 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution creates municipalities and units of local
government, while Article 9 empowers the state and units of local government to levy and collect
taxes. Within the legal language, there is the strict requirement that non-property tax revenue, as
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well as property tax revenue, must be reasonable. For example, under Article IX, Section 2 of
the Illinois Constitution addressing Non-Property Taxes, it states, “In any law classifying the
subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects
and objects within each class be taxed uniformly.” The issue of defining what is reasonable has
led to further clarification in state statutes and court opinions. As part of this definition, there is
legal guidance on how taxes can be levied and what services can be appropriated and spent on, as
well as language addressing the amount of cash reserves that can be carried over under the
“reasonable” doctrine (Grotto, 2008).

2.2.2 Illinois Court Decisions
Illinois courts have warned against accumulating excessive amounts in unreserved fund
balances (Grotto, 2008). In one case pitting the citizens of the Lisle Township Road District
against the district itself, the court ruled that without proper justification a unit of local
government could not accumulate excess revenues (Allegis Reality Investors, Inc. v. Novac,
2008). While the term “excess" was left to the discretion of the courts, many courts have ruled
that holding two to three times the amount of annual expenditures was illegal (Grotto, 2008).
This issue for local governments, particularly for counties and townships located outside of Cook
County that are authorized to levy taxes without limits, has been tested in the Illinois Supreme
Court. Through court cases, specifically Toynton v. Commonwealth Edison, the Illinois court
system ruled against the unnecessary accumulation of tax money in the public treasury.
According to a 1969 Illinois court case, Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d
542, units of local government are limited in their maximum cash reserves to approximately
200% of the average expenses incurred over the past three years, and anything over this may be
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considered excessive. There have been multiple lawsuits brought forth in Illinois objecting to
the cash accumulated by units of local governments citing the Miller threshold to question
excessive taxing because of large cash accumulations.

2.2.3 Illinois State Statutes
The Illinois State Statutes authorize counties to levy and collect taxes as well as to invest
these revenues in financial instruments including bonds, savings accounts, certificates, money
markets, securities, and public investment pools. All such investments and deposits must meet
strict criteria to protect the public’s interest (55 ILCS 5 Counties Code). According to the 2013
Illinois Property Tax Rate and Levy Manual, produced by the Illinois Department of Revenue,
non-home rule counties with a population of 500,000 or more may create a property tax rate of
.02% and or sell bonds for the purpose of developing a Working Cash Fund, “to enable the
county to have in its treasury at all times sufficient money to meet demands for ordinary and
necessary expenditures for general corporate purposes” (55 ILCS 5/6-2001). The fund may not
exceed an aggregate amount of $20,000,000. Similarly, counties under 500,000 may create
working cash funds with a slightly higher property tax rate not to exceed .025% for the same
purpose of enabling the county to accumulate sufficient money to meet its operational needs.
However, the statute does not set a maximum aggregate amount (55 ILCS 5/6-27003, 5/627004). Some state departments have weighed in on the question of what is an appropriate level
of savings. The Illinois State Comptroller’s office has acknowledged that maintaining positive
unreserved fund balances may be beneficial for local governments but it has not set definite
parameters as to how much should be saved (Illinois State Comptroller’s Office, 2004). The
Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity recommended maintaining a
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minimum cash reserve of six months operating expenses (Township Officials of Illinois webpost. www.toi.org/Resources/FAQ/).

2.3 Professional Reporting Standards for Local Government Finance Reports
Professional norms and standards illuminate county budgetary and auditing practices within
the boundaries established by the statutes and court rulings of a given state. Generally accepted
accounting principles set requirements for financial reporting and provide guidelines for
supporting assessments of finances – to provide uniform financial reports. Private sector
businesses often abide by these guidelines although they are not required to do so. Generally
accepted accounting principles originate from efforts by the federal government in conjunction
with professional accounting groups to create standards to prevent the manipulative role shady
financial reporting played in bringing about the Great Depression of 1929. Enforcement of
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) laid a foundation for continued oversight.
Currently, state financial reports comply with GAAP that is monitored and updated by the
independent FASB. About half of the states officially require local governments to follow
GAAP guidelines and as many as 70% of local governments comply (Governmental Accounting
Standards Board, 2008).
Independent agencies keep principles and reporting standards up-to-date. The Financial
Accounting Foundation (FAF) was formed in 1972 and oversees Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB). The independent FASB was formed in response to recommendations from the
American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) and has seven full-time members. It is further overseen by
a 30-person Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council. The FAF appoints members of
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FASB and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board and monitors actions to ensure
transparency and fairness.
The GASB is an organization established in 1984 charged with creating GAAP for state and
local government organizations. It aims to establish and improve standards of state and local
governmental accounting (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2015). It utilizes GAAP to
ensure greater accountability and well-informed decision making (Government Accounting
Standards Board, 2015). Throughout the years, GASB has released over 80 statements and
hundreds of recommendations for state and local governments (GAAP, 2017). We highlight two
of the more relevant statements below.

2.3.1 GASB Statement No. 34
Issued in June of 1999, Statement № 34 was found in one study to be ineffective in shaping
financial report standards to achieve more clarity and consistency. While the conditions for
maintaining reserved fund balances were better understood by the users since it implied
assigning assets for specific purposes, the unreserved fund balance brought confusion and
inconsistency into the reporting process (Kelly, 2013). As shown in Figure 1, the fund balance is
the difference between assets and liabilities. It may also be viewed as the difference between
revenues and expenditures and is reported in governmental accounts (Kelly, 2013). This money
is sometimes appropriated or carried forward to fund portions of the budget for the following
year. Under GASB 34, some portions may be formally reserved or legally restricted by law
while other portions may be left as an informal reserve or unreserved fund balance. However,
the GASB believed the reserved and unreserved categories created confusion and was not well
understood and resulted in inconsistent use in the application of the terms (Kelly, 2013). Figure 1
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further shows that some portions of the unreserved fund balance are not designated and are
treated as a “general operating reserve” or money received by governments but not spent
(Massey and Tyer, 1990, 40).

Fund Balance
(Assets-Liabilities)

Appropriated
working cash

Reserved

Unreserved

(formal)

(Informal)

Designated

Undesignated
(General Operating Reserve)

Figure 1. Fund Balance Depiction under GASB 34.

Since governments had an unclear level of discretion in determining whether funds should be
designated for specific purposes or left undesignated to be spent at will, a great number of
financial officers reported problems and errors in dealing with the unreserved fund balance
(Kelly, 2013). In light of complaints and requests from users, the GASB conducted a survey
following the implementation of Statement № 34 to learn that governments demonstrate
significant differences in understanding the principles of fund balance accounting (Governmental
Accounting Standards Board, 2006).

13

2.3.2 GASB Statement No. 54
In response to the above-discussed issue, the GASB released statement № 54 in February of
2009. The objective of the statement was to spell out government fund type definitions in detail,
and to provide new fund balance classifications in order to improve financial reporting and make
it easier to understand (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009). It eliminated reserved
and unreserved categories in favor of non-spendable, restricted, committed, assigned, and
unassigned fund balances. Moreover, governments were now required to disclose information
about policies that regulate the distribution of funds between categories, constraints that are
imposed on the amounts, as well as a designation within the fund in the notes to the financial
reports (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009).
Table 1 shows that the non-spendable category includes items (e.g., prepaid expenses and
inventory) that are “not in spendable form or legally or contractually required to be maintained
intact” (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009, 3). The Restricted category includes
funds externally imposed by grantors, creditors, or other governments. These resources are also
“imposed by law through constitutional provisions or enabling legislation” (Ibid). The
Committed fund balance encompasses “amounts that can only be used for specific purposes
pursuant to constraints imposed by formal action of the government’s highest level of decisionmaking authority” (Ibid, 5). The Assigned Fund Balance encompasses those funds “intended to
be used for a specific purpose either by the action of the governing body or the delegation of that
authority to another official (i.e., the city manager)” (Kelly, 2013, 728). The Unassigned Fund
Balance includes monies “unassigned, or available to spend without restrictions. This would
include most nonspecific stabilization funds” (Ibid).
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Table 1.
New Categories of Fund Balance
GASB 34
Reserved
Unreserved

GASB 54
Nonspendable
Restricted
Committed
Assigned
Unassigned

Not only has this issue recently captured the attention of academic researchers, but also in
1990 the GFOA, a professional association of state and local finance officers that served the
public finance profession since 1906 (www.gfoa.org/main/about.shtml), acknowledged a lack of
research and literature in this area; in part because public officials did not disclose this
information to the public. Interestingly, research suggests that public officials themselves do not
pay adequate attention to fund balances or may not even be aware of these funds. Even those
public officials who are aware tend to focus more on the legal requirements of maintaining an
annual balanced budget (Massey and Tyer, 1990; Tyer, 1993). Tyer (1993) posits that, “when
you talk to local government managers and finance officers, they will tell you that many local
governments use reserve funds, although in some cases not given that formal designation, to plan
for the future and avoid frequent tax increases” (Tyer, 1993, 75). By contrast, prior research
indicated that this money often was unspent and not shown in the budget but rather in other
financial documents like audits reports that were not readily accessible to the public (Tyer,
1993).
For the most part, however, it is a common practice for local governments to maintain an
unreserved fund balance rather than a formal reserve such as a rainy day fund (Tyer, 1993). In
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fact, they are encouraged by GFOA to do so. It was not until 2002 that the GFOA officially put
on record a recommended practice for local governments to maintain no less than 5 to 15% of
the general fund operating expenditures as an unreserved fund balance (Gauthier, 2002).

3. Illinois Local Government “Saving” via Unreserved Fund Balances
Some slack resources in the budget are necessary for local governments’ fiscal health
(Marlowe, 2013). Convention holds that such slack helps stabilize expenditures and the
provision of important local services through good and bad good economic times by tempering
revenue volatility as well as helping meet unexpected service demands. Not surprisingly, studies
find most local governments hold unreserved or unassigned funds, but in many instances these
funds may be in amounts far greater than necessary to meet revenue volatility or economic
downturns. For instance Hembree et al. (1999) found in a study of North Carolina and South
Carolina municipalities that nearly all municipalities held some portion of the fund balances in
reserve. Carter and Vogt (1989) similarly found in an analysis of county and city fiscal
responsibility that all jurisdictions maintained slack resources. (Hembree et al., 1999) concluded
that it was in almost every locality’s best interest to accumulate unreserved balances noting that
the ideal amount was dependent on each government’s unique situation.
It is less well understood why local governments often hold large reserves and/or the roles
these large fiscal reserves play in local government finance. It is not clear whether the amount of
slack many local governments maintain is appropriate. Studies of local governments in several
states, as well as in Illinois, suggest there are a number of factors and circumstances that may
affect the size and use of unreserved or unassigned fund balances and this makes it difficult to
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assess whether slack resources are excessive or not (Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005; Stewart,
2009; Stewart, 2011; Stewart and Hamman, 2015; Stewart et al., 2018; Wang and Hou, 2012).
Most studies assess the effect that some combinations of socio-economic and institutional
factors have on slack resources. The relevant factors vary depending upon which study is
considered. For instance, in a study of North Carolina counties, Wang and Hou (2012) tested
whether volatility in revenue flow occurred over business cycles and intergovernmental factors
affect the creation and use of slack resources in local government finance. They found that
property and sales tax effort as well as capital outlays relate positively to the size of budgetary
slack. Population size and unemployment had a negative impact. Marlow’s analyses of
Minnesota and Michigan municipalities found that government perception of and response to its
fiscal environment were the most important determinant and property tax revenues, rates of
home ownership, and the burden of debt service mattered most (Marlowe, 2004 and 2005).
Similarly, Gianakis and Snow (2007), who also focused on municipalities, found that wealthier
communities more likely to hold unreserved fund balances and municipalities usually instituted
these funds after experiencing a deep recession. In addition, the funds were often used more to
stabilize budgets when state aid decreased, rather than during economic downturns alone.
Other studies find similar dynamics at play in Mississippi counties’ unreserved fund balances
(Stewart, 2009; Stewart, 2011). Counties in Mississippi maintain anywhere from negative
balances to over 100% of annual expenditures in slack resources. To assess whether Mississippi
counties use slack to stabilize expenditures, the study analyzed county finances during economic
upturn and downturn years. This allowed the formulation of a more complete view of what and
how certain variables impacted unreserved fund balances. Property taxes, other revenues, and
county per-capita income contributed positively to the size of unreserved fund balances during
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times of economic prosperity. This analysis also showed that counties with more debt per capita
had smaller unreserved fund balances in both periods. Counties with larger minority populations
maintained smaller unreserved fund balances in economic downturns. Faster growing counties
tended to have less need for unreserved fund balances in both periods of resource abundance and
scarcity. The study also found that the form of county government affected unreserved fund
balance levels. Moreover, a significant relationship exists between the types of government,
Beat or Unit, and the amount of fund balances held. The Unit system models on more
professional types of local government and institutionally separates political and administrative
responsibilities by requiring that an elected board of supervisors appoint a county administrator
to execute policy decisions. The Beat system is the more traditional form that combines
legislative and executive functions. Typically, the Unit system holds fewer unreserved funds
than Beat systems (Stewart, 2009; Stewart, 2011).
The findings for Illinois local government mirrors those found in other states. Analyzing the
effects of variables such as revenue diversification, level of dependence on intergovernmental
revenues, debt per capita, population change, and political ideology, Hendrick’s analysis of
Chicago suburban municipalities found fiscal performance (i.e., operating surplus or deficit)
most affected fund balances. She argued that recognition of increased risk and a lack of “fiscal
flexibility" resulted in more unreserved resources (Hendrick, 2006, 42). The study concluded
that unreserved fund balances were most important during fiscal downturns when maintaining
reserves to compensate for risks became less important.
Fewer studies focus on the extent to which slack stabilizes budgets over business cycles and
systematic evidence that local governments save money in good times and draw down slack in
bad times is mixed. In a study of North Carolina counties, Wang and Hou (2012) found no
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evidence that North Carolina counties used slack counter-cyclically to stabilize expenditures
over business cycles. Alternatively, in his panel study of Minnesota cities, Marlowe (2005)
found that unreserved general funds bolstered expenditures during economic downturns. A
recent panel study of Illinois counties reported similar findings. Taking a similar analytical
approach, Stewart et al. (2018) found that Illinois counties used unrestricted fund balances in
governmental activity funds counter-cyclically. These results were also consistent with Hendrick
who found slack to be most significant in downturns.

3. Data and Analysis
3.1 Illinois County Government Unreserved General Fund Balances
Figure 2 shows that Illinois counties maintained unassigned fund balances with
considerable variability in FY 2015. The table presents the unreserved or unassigned fund
balance for only 100 Illinois counties, data for two of the counties, Edwards and Scott, were not
available. Specifically, the table shows that counties maintained a UFB level ranging from below
0% to 134% of general fund expenditures. Specifically, three counties had amounts below 0%,
36 counties maintained amounts between 0% to 24%, Twenty-eight counties maintained 25 to
45%, and 33 counties maintained amounts between 46 to 134%. It is also noteworthy to mention
that the GFOA suggests that the adequacy of the amount maintained should be based on the
“government’s own specific circumstances,” but recommends that “at a minimum, that generalpurpose governments, regardless of size, maintain unreserved fund balance in the general fund of
no less than 5 to 15% of regular general fund operating revenues, or no less than one to two
months of regular general fund operating expenditures.” They also acknowledge that a
government’s particular situation may require them to maintain amounts that exceed this
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recommendation (http://www.gfoa.org/services/rp/caafr/caafr-appropriate-level.pdf). Further
analysis shows that 14 of the 36 counties that fell within the 0 to 24% range met the GFOA
recommendation and maintained the benchmark of 5 to 15%. Overall, however, it appears that
most of the counties (86) maintained levels that exceed or fall below the GFOA recommendation
(Carter and Vogt, 1989; Hembree et al., 1999; Marlowe, 2005; Stewart, 2009, 2001a; Wang and
Hou, 2012).

40

Number of Counties

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Below 0%

0-24%

25-45%

46-134%

Figure 2. UFB as a percent of GF Expenditures for 2015. Source: County CAFRs for 2016.
N = 100.
What seems clear is that many counties maintain savings well in excess of the GFOA
recommendations. There is concern that currently there may be too much room for abuse and
lack of transparency as a result of a lack of adequately stringent legal or policy guidelines
(Stewart et al., 2015).

3.2 Illinois County Unreserved General Fund Balance Policy Characteristics
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This analysis uses the GFOA Unreserved Reserve Fund sample policy as the basis for
assessing Illinois counties’ unreserved general fund balances. The Government Financial
Officers Association recognize the need for governments to maintain sufficient levels of reserve
funds to mitigate financial risks, such as revenue shortfalls, drastic budget cuts, and
unanticipated emergency expenditures but also seeks to promote transparency and public
accountability. To these ends, it created a model policy to assist governments in formalizing the
practice of holding a reserve fund. In addition, the GFOA advocates that such funds may help
stave off potential swings in tax rates caused by the lack of planning. In developing a policy to
govern unreserved fund balances, GFOA asks units of government to consider that more
unreserved funds are needed if revenues are unpredictable and/or expenditures are volatile.
Governments should also anticipate substantial one-time outlays brought about by disasters,
immediate capital needs, or state budget cuts. In setting unreserved fund levels, it is also
important to consider covering the potential drain upon general fund resources from other funds
as well as the availability of resources in other funds. It is also important to consider the
potential impact on the entity’s bond ratings and the corresponding increased cost of borrowed
funds as well as the commitments and assignments (i.e., governments may wish to maintain
higher levels of unreserved fund balances to compensate for any portion of an unreserved fund
balance already committed or assigned by the government for a specific purpose) (GFOA, 2016.
Best Practice: Appropriate Level of Unreserved Fund Balance in the General Fund.
www.gfoa.org).
Based on these considerations, we applied five essential criteria in an analysis of Illinois
county policies. If a county adopted a formal policy, we also determined whether the policy
contained language explaining the need for the fund to the public. Next the policy was analyzed
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to see if it recommended a specific funding level. Third, the analysis determined whether the
policy conformed to GFOA’s recommended funding level of always having no less than two
months of operating funds on hand. Policies were also checked to see whether there was
language regulating how the unreserved reserves funds could be spent. Finally, the policy was
checked to see whether there was language addressing how the unreserved reserve fund was to
be replenished if it was expended. The five GFOA variables in this analysis include:
•

evidence of the county adopting a formal unreserved reserve fund policy;

•

policy language explaining the need for an unreserved reserve fund;

•

policy language specifying the fund level of two months of operations or greater;

•

policy language that regulates how the unreserved reserve fund may be spent; and

•

policy language that specifies how the unreserved reserve fund is to be replenished.

In addition, we assessed whether the policy addressed any of these three additional financial
details:
•

policy language specifying the minimum unreserved fund balance;

•

policy language specifying the maximum unreserved fund balance; and

•

fiscal year 2014 unreserved fund balances as reported in the annual financial audit.

Illinois has 102 counties with only 18 that have fund balance policies (see the map in
Appendix 1). The fund policy analysis of these eighteen counties was derived by applying these
criteria, including the five based upon the GFOA recommendations for county unreserved
reserve fund policies. The additional criteria identify greater financial details of unreserved
reserve fund policies and practices at the county level.

3.2 Unreserved Fund Balance Policy Findings
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Table 2 shows that of the 102 Illinois counties, only 18 (Carroll, Champaign, Cook,
DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry,
Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion, and Will) have some form of an official public
policy or published public statement directing the County Board on its use of
Unreserved/Unassigned reserve funds. Thus, only 18% of Illinois counties have adopted an
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement. Most of these counties are in
Northeastern Illinois and include Cook and the five Collar Counties, or in Northwestern Illinois
with a scattering of other counties in Central Illinois. There are no Metro-East or southern
Illinois counties included.
In reviewing the 18 policies, Kankakee County is the only county to meet all five GFOA
unreserved reserve fund policy recommendations that include: explaining the need for the fund
policy, specifying the fund level, keeping no less than two months of operating reserves in the
fund, language regulating how the fund is to be spent, and language that specifies how the fund
is to be replenished if spent. Thus, only 1% of Illinois counties have adopted an
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement that meets all five recommended policy
specifications per GFOA guidelines.
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Table 2.
Illinois Counties with Fund Balance Policies
County

Carroll

Champaign

Cook

DeKalb

*Formal
Policy

*Explains Need for
Fund

YesYes- avoid revenue
ordinance
shortfall

Professional Fund Balance as a
County
Percentage of
Administrator
Expenditures

*Specifies Fund Level

*> 2 Months of
Operating Revenue

Minimum
Specified

Maximum
Specificed

*Regulates
Expenditures

*Specifies
Replenishment

Yes- 30%

Yes

Minimum 30%
of annual
operations

No

No

Yes- create plan to
restore

No

43%

No

45 day
minimum or
12.5%

No- will create
plan to spend
surplus

No

Yes- will create plan
to restore

Yes

14%

Yes- 2 months is
maximum

Yes- 1 month is
minimum

Yes- 2 months
is maximum

No

Yes- a plan must be
developed to replace

No

5%

Yes

Yes- 4 months
is minimum

No

No

No plan to restore

Yes

28%

YesYes- meet reserve
Yes- 12.5%
published policy, avoid future
policies
debt, repay debt
Yes- protect against
Yesreducing services, 1 to 2 months audited
published
operating
raising taxes,
policies
expenditures
revenue shortfalls,
or 1 time
Primary reason is
Yesto plan for
Yes
published
contingencies
policies
(emergencies)

Douglas

YesYes- lists several
published objectives to ensure
policies
fiscal stability

Yes

No- 1 month

Yes-1 month

No- specifies
how surplus
MAY be spent

No

Yes- create a plan to
restore

No

19%

DuPage

Yespublished
as part of
annual

Yes

Yes

Yes- 3 months
(25%)

No

No

No

No

49%

Yes-says it's not
scheduled for
expense during
FY17.

No

Yes

55%

No- Corporate Fund
Yes-Special
Reserve, Emergency
Reserve, and
Property Tax Freeze
Protection Funds

No

No

69%

Yes- order of
expenditures from
accounts

Yes-reduce
expenditures,
increase revenue

No

-17%

No

Yes- reduce
expenditures,
increase revenue

Yes

71%

Yes- after
contingency funds
are exhausted and
per a plan to
address the
situation

No

Yes

19%

Jo Daviess

Kane

Kankakee

Kendall

Lake

Macoupin

Yes- for major
emergency or
economic distress

Yes- to ensure
sufficient revenues
Yes- 3 months
Yes- annual against shortfalls,
Yes
Yes
No
of operating
ordinance
unforeseen
expenses
emergencies, and
i h GASB Yes-County Corporate
Yes-l operating
Yes- Corporate
contingencies,
Fund No- Special
YesFund: 3 months
unforeseen capital
Reserve Fund,
Yes- Corporate Fund
No
published
of operating
expenditures,
Emergency Reserve
policies
expenses
emergencies, and
Fund, Property Tax
protect against
Freeze Protection
Yes- mitigate
YesYes-20% is max,
current & future
published
Yes- 20%
Yes
Yes- 15% to 20% spend on nonrisk, revenue
policies via
recurring
shortfalls,
resolution
unanticipated
Yes- to fund current
Yes- 7 months,
Yes- 6 months
and future
Yes- Board
Yes- 6 to 7 monts of
transfer
Yes
(50% of
operations, capital
Resolution
reserves
overage to
operating cost)
needs, and cash
capital fund
flow
Yes- to maintain
No- balance
financial stability
may exceed
Yes15% of annual
Yes- 15% of annual
printed in due to temporary
No- 1.5 months
1.5 months
revenue shortfalls,
operations for
operations
annual
emergencies,
capital projects
budget
economic
or other one
Yesprinted in
annual
budget

Yes- to preserve
services

Yes- 15% of General
Funds annual
operations

No- slightly less

No

yes- not to
exceed 15% of
County's most
recent General
Fund budget

Yes- by a 2/3rds
vote of Board, can
NOT be used for
capital projects

No

No

34%

McHenry

Yes- annual Yes- concerns over
budget
general economic
resolution
conditions and
and
reality imposed by
published
the Property Tax

Yes- 150 days of
operations

Yes- 5 months

Yes- 100 days
of operations

Yes- will
approve plan to
spend down
balance above
150 day reserve

No

Yes- if below 100 day
operations, Finance &
Audit will develop
plan to restore

Yes

47%

Peoria

Yes- annual Yes- to maintain
budget & credit rating, meet
audit
shortfalls

Yes- 24% of annual
operations

Yes- 3 months

Yes- 24% of
annual
operations

No- specifies
how surplus
MAY be spent

No

Yes- if falls below
24%, County shall
rebuild the balance
within 1 yr.

Yes

20%

Yes-slightly more

Yes- 20% of
annual
expenditures

No

No

Yes- acknowledge ok
to fall below and may
take time to rebuild

No

12%

Yes- 4 months

Yes- 33% or 4
months

No

No

No

Yes

71%

Yes

25% of annual
appropriation

No

No

No

No

77%

22%

Yes- if exceeds
26% Finance
Committee
shall
recommend

No

Yes- if falls below
22%, Finance
Committee will
recommend corrective
action

No

Yes- to guard
against service
Yes- Annual disruption due to
Yes- 20% of annual
Rock Island
expenditures
Budget unexpected revenue
shortfall or
unpredicted
YesYes-33% of projected
statement
Tazewell
No
expenditures
in annual
audit
Vermilion

Will

Yes- annual
budget
Yesstatement
in annual
CAFR

No

No

Yes

Yes-25% (3 months of
operations)

Yes- 3 months

28%

Note: * GFOA Recommended
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As shown in Table 3, nine counties (Carroll, Champaign, Cook, DeKalb, Douglas, Kane,
Kankakee, Kendall, and McHenry) have identifiable formal unreserved reserve fund polices
either through fiscal policy statements or via published board resolutions or ordinances per the
recommendation of the GFOA. The remaining nine counties (DuPage, Jo Daviess, Lake,
Macoupin, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion, and Will) have formal policy statements
published in annual budgets, financial plans, or audits.
In reviewing the 18 counties with a formal statement, 15 (Carroll, Champaign, Cook,
DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry,
Peoria, and Rock Island) have language explaining the need for the fund per the
recommendations of the GFOA. This equates to only 15% of Illinois counties having adopted an
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement to explain the need for the fund in accord
with GFOA guidelines. Moreover, 14 counties (Carroll, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Jo Daviess,
Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion and Will) have
language that meets the GFOA recommendations of specifying a reserve fund balance of two
months or more of operating revenues. This leaves us with four counties (Champaign, Douglas,
Lake, and Macoupin) with policy statements failing to meet the minimum reserve fund threshold
of no less than two months of operations. Thus, we find that only 14% of Illinois counties meet
GFOA guidelines with a formal policy to hold at least two months of operating revenue in
reserve. When it comes to policy language regulating how the unreserved reserve fund is to be
spent, only four counties (Jo Daviess, Kankakee, Lake, and Macoupin) include language
regulating expenditures per GFOA guidelines, however 10 counties (Carroll, Champaign, Cook,
Douglas, Kankakee, Kendall, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, and Will) have language built into
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policy statements specifying how the unreserved reserve fund is to be replenished if funds fall
below the minimum balance expended per GFOA guidelines. It is noteworthy that only four
counties out of 18 or 4% of Illinois counties have an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy
or statement adopted language that regulated how the unreserved/unassigned reserve fund could
be spent in accord with the recommendations of GFOA guidelines, while 10% of Illinois
counties adopted language that specified how the reserve fund was to be replenished per the
recommendations of the GFOA guidelines.
Further analysis found that six Illinois counties (Cook, Kankakee, Lake, Macoupin,
McHenry, and Will) in the sample of those with some GFOA unreserved reserve fund policy
language, adopted language placing a cap on the maximum amount that may be accumulated in
the unreserved reserve fund. The maximum reserve fund cap ranges from no more than two
months of reserves (Cook County) to no more than seven months per Kendall County. Thus, it is
surprising that only 6% of all Illinois counties adopted some type of regulatory language placing
a cap on the maximum amount of tax dollars that that may be accumulated in an
unassigned/unreserved reserve fund.
To understand why certain counties adopted unassigned/unreserved reserve fund policies or
statements, we examined whether those counties had professional county administrators. Of the
18 counties with an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement, eight, or almost
half, (Champaign, DeKalb, Jo Daviess, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, Peoria, and Tazewell) operated
with a professional county administrator. Statewide, there are 24 counties that have a
professional county administrator. Therefore, it does not appear that by hiring a professional
county administrator a county is necessarily more likely to adopt an unassigned/unreserved
reserve fund policy. Lastly, when it comes to the form of county government, commissioner vs.
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non-commissioner, all 18 (Carroll, Champaign, Cook, DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo Daviess,
Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell,
Vermillion, and Will) with an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement operate in
a non-commission form of county government. Given there are 102 counties that may choose
what form of government for which to operate, it is noteworthy that 100% of Illinois counties
that adopted an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement operate in a noncommission form of government.
To deepen our analysis, we ranked the 102 Illinois counties and pulled out the 18 counties
with an unassigned/unreserved reserve fund policy or statement by five variables: population, per
capita income, median household income, unreserved fund balance, and unreserved balance as a
percent of total annual expenditures as presented in Table 3. When reviewing state population
by county, the top six counties in population (Cook, DuPage, Lake, Will, Kane, and McHenry)
account for 65% of the total Illinois population as of 2010 census; and these all have an
unreserved reserve fund policy. When we expand this ranking, 15 out of the 18 counties
(Champaign, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry,
Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion, and Will) account for 69% of the total Illinois
population and have an unreserved reserve fund policy. Thus, the higher the county population,
the more likely it is to have an unreserved reserve fund policy.
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Table 3.
Illinois Counties Rankings with Fund Balance Policies and Statements

County

Population

Per Capita
Income

Carroll
Champaign
Cook
DeKalb
Douglas
DuPage
Jo Daviess
Kane
Kankakee
Kendall
Lake
Macoupin
McHenry
Peoria
Rock Island
Tazewell
Vermillion
Will

75
10
1
20
58
2
54
5
18
16
3
32
6
12
14
15
21
4

22
35
9
41
74
2
17
7
55
5
1
51
3
12
26
15
85
6

Unassigned
Median
Fund
Household
Balance
Income
48
64
18
23
35
2
30
7
34
1
3
36
4
37
47
15
82
5

58
23
1
18
76
2
29
3
96
8
6
40
5
15
37
7
14
4

UFB as
Percent of
Total Annual
Expenditure
41
77
88
58
72
31
26
19
102
17
71
52
33
67
81
16
14
59

Sources: (Census, 2016) and (Services, 2013).

The per capita income variable ranking shows that the top 5 out of 6 counties (Lake, DuPage,
McHenry, Kendall, and Will) have an unreserved reserve fund policy. If we expand this ranking
slightly, the top 10 out of 17 counties (Cook, DuPage, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kendall, Lake,
McHenry, Peoria, Tazewell, and Will) in per capita income have an unreserved reserve fund
policy. Thus, just like our population variable, the higher the county per capita income, the more
likely a county is to have an unreserved reserve fund policy.
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When we looked at Illinois income data by household, we found similar results as with per
capita income in that 16 of the 18 counties (Carroll, Cook, DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo
Daviess, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell,
and Will) with an unreserved reserve fund policy are in the top 50% of county rankings. Again,
the higher the county median household income, the more likely the county is to have an
unreserved reserve fund policy.
Similarly, we expected to find that the county with larger unassigned/unreserved reserve fund
balance would also be more likely to have a formal reserve policy. Not surprising, eight out of
the top nine counties (Cook, DuPage, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, Tazewell, and Will) with
the largest unreserved/unassigned reserve fund balances adopted a reserve fund policy. As
expected, the higher the unreserved reserve fund balance, the more likely that county is to have
an unreserved reserve fund policy.
However, when we ranked all 102 counties by unassigned/unreserved reserve fund balance
as a percent of total annual expenditures, our expectations did not hold. No county with an
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund balance equal to or greater than 80% or more of annual
operating expenditures had an unreserved reserve fund policy. Of the 18 counties with
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policies, the average balance equaled 35.7% of total annual
expenditures for all counties. This contrasts with average balance of 38.7% of the total annual
expenditures for the remaining 84 counties with unreserved/unassigned reserve fund but no
formal policy or statement. Therefore, it appears that the higher the unreserved/unassigned
reserve fund balance as a percent of annual expenditures, the less likely a county is to have an
unreserved reserve fund policy.
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Based on these observations, we further assessed these antecedents of county adoption of an
unreserved fund balance policy by estimating a logistic regression equation. The dependent
variable for the analysis was whether a county had a general fund unreserved fund policy. The
independent variables for the analysis were 2015 estimated county population, 2015 estimated
median family income, ideology (percent of the vote for Clinton in 2016), general fund
unreserved fund balance as a proportion of total expenditures (2015), and the type of county
government form. Based on what the analysis has shown so far, we expect that population will
affect policy adoption positively. We also expect wealthier, more liberal counties will have a
policy. There appears to be some findings to suggest that the form of government affects local
government financial administration (Desantis and Renner, 1994; Marlowe, 2005; Stewart,
2011). Svara (1998), Marlowe (2004), and (Stewart, 2011) caution that reformed local
government impacts may be difficult to disentangle as reform structures generally exhibit hybrid
characteristics tempering progressivism with political accountability. While professional
administrators may be on point where policymaking is concerned, elected officials tend to impact
implementation of policy and its administration regardless of the type of structure.
Similarly in Illinois, the more progressive township government form supersedes the traditional,
commission county government form (Banovetz and Peters, 2006). It is expected that its impact
will also be positive. Finally, the preceding analysis argues that counties with larger proportions
of fund balances unreserved will be less likely to have a policy. Two counties did not post
CAFRs so there are 100 cases. The results are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4.
Logistic Regression Predicting County Adoption of Unreserved Fund Balance Policy

Variable
Pop Est 2015
Med Income
Ideology
Township Govt Form
Unreserved Fund as a % of Expenditures
Constant

Odds Ratio
1.00*
1.00**
1.15***
4.30
2.06
.00001**

Standard Error
.0000
.0000
.0598
4.07
2.37
.000005

N=100
LR chi2 (5) = 44.21
Prob > chi2 =.0000
Pseudo R2 = .47
Log Likelihood = -25.032
* p > .10 ; ** p > .05; *** p > .001
The overall model performs well with Chi2 = .0000 and the pseudo R2 = .46. Two of the
variables are positive and statistically significant at the .05 level (i.e., income and ideology) and
population is significant at the .10 level. We expected that township county fund balances would
be more transparent – township counties as opposed to commission ones would be more likely to
have policies for unreserved funds. The sign of the variable distinguishing township commission
counties is positive as expected but at .12 just misses statistical significance. Unreserved fund
levels as a proportion of total expenditures are not statistically significant when considering the
other variables. Therefore, the findings for the most part confirm our initial expectations.
Larger, wealthier counties are more likely to have a policy, as are counties that are more liberal.
The other counties in Illinois, especially the mid-sized, and even the smaller and more rural
counties may well want to consider the advantages of adopting unreserved fund level
policies, and certainly county officials in all Illinois counties would be prudent to pay close
attention to the levels of funds available in these fund accounts.
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4. Discussion and Conclusion
This comprehensive state analysis sheds some light on the types of Illinois counties that
adopt formal unreserved reserve fund policies. Even though this comprehensive review of all
102 counties in Illinois is relatively large, only a small number, 18 counties (18%) actually have
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policies or statements. The operation of 18% of Illinois
counties adopting formal policies needs to be further reviewed and compared to other states. This
finding should also be compared to longitudinal data to identify if there is progress or stagnation
in the adoption of such policies in Illinois. For example, it would be interesting to learn if the
adoption of a formal policy results from an audit finding, the demand for transparency by
taxpayers, from past questionable expenditures, or from unplanned emergencies. This
information may be helpful for the GFOA as it seeks to improve transparency and for
bonding agencies as they seek dedicated revenue sources.
It is significant to note that only one county in the 102 Illinois county sample complies with
all five of the GFOA recommended unreserved reserve fund policy recommendations, thus only
1% of Illinois counties completely comply with GFOA guidelines. This observation includes
even some counties with a professional county administrator failing to adopt all the
recommended policy language that regulates expenditures. Of particular note, only four counties
out of 102 (4%) address how the unreserved reserve fund is to be spent, while 10 counties have
adopted language for how it is to be replenished through formal policy. This observation could
be a function of county officials and administrators not wanting to limit themselves on how to
expend the funds nor bind themselves to having to rebuild the fund, but this research is
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inconclusive. Future research may wish to address that reluctance or make
recommendations to improve compliance for transparency and accountability.
Of the 24 Illinois counties with a professional county administrator (out of our sample of 102
total Illinois counties), eight adopted formal unreserved reserve fund policies. This observation
contrasts with those Illinois counties without a professional county administrator adopting a
formal policy by a ten to eight county ratio. Thus, in our sample, only 1/3rd or 33% of
professionally managed counties adopted formal unreserved reserve fund policies. By contrast,
this means that 2/3rds of professionally managed counties in Illinois have not adopted a fund
policy or statement. The findings suggest that professionally managed counties are less
likely to adopt formal fund policies than counties without such professional management
and guidance. Masters of Public Administration programs may wish to include training to
address the need for reserve fund policies and how to develop and implement these policies.
In a similar finding, 100% of the counties that adopted some type of unassigned/unreserved
reserve fund policy or statement operated under a non-commission form of county government.
Therefore, through further study, we may be able to assume that non-commission forms of
governance are more likely to adopt formal fund policies than commissioner-governed counties.
This observation may assist the GFOA as it seeks to educate county governments in the
need for formal policies by designing material targeting commissioners.
One notable finding was that only six counties with a formal unreserved reserve fund policy
or statement included language to set a maximum cap on the fund. This contrasts with
recommended GFOA language to set a minimum balance of at least two months of operating
cash, which equals 16% of the annual operations. In fact, 17 out of the 18 counties set some sort
of minimum thresholds with 14 of those meeting the minimum two-month recommendation.
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Future research may wish to address the need for maximum fund caps to improve public
transparency and accountability and over guidelines and policy language. Future research
also needs to ponder the impact that ideology has in our multivariate model and the
implication this may raise for transparency and citizen participation in the budgeting
process.
In relationship to the size of the county, it appears that counties with larger populations tend
to have larger unreserved reserve fund balances and are more likely to adopt unreserved reserve
fund policies. The top six counties in population (Cook, DuPage, Lake, Will, Kane, and
McHenry account for 65% of the total Illinois population) are the same counties with the largest
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund balances, all of which have an unreserved reserve fund
policy. Population size and income are both positive and statistically significant variables in the
multivariable model. This observation may help associations such as GFOA and bonding
agencies design and develop education and training workshops for smaller county
governments to assist them with adopting formal unreserved reserve fund policies and
thereby improving fiduciary responsibilities and accountability.
Lastly, we noted that the higher the average reserve fund balance is in relationship to annual
operating expenditures, the less likely that county is to have a formal unassigned/unreserved
reserve fund policy. However, the variable is not statistically significant in the multivariate
model. This contrasts with the finding that the higher the fund dollar amount the more likely the
county is to have a formal policy. Although more research needs to be done to fully understand
this relationship, it appears that a large cash balance may trigger greater audit scrutiny and the
need for an unassigned/unreserved reserve fund policy, while those counties with smaller cash
balances, but with a greater balance in relationship to annual expenditures, are able to avoid such
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audit inquiry and retain fiscal flexibility. These are all interesting findings which should be
useful for county and state level officials and to the relevant professional associations such as the
GFOA as well as faculty in Master of Public Administration programs.
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Appendix 1
Map of the Counties in Illinois with Fund Balance Policies
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